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Approved for Release

Background

(U) On 5 August 2014, at approximately 0725Z/1155D* (I will use local time throughout this report), an Afghan National Army (ANA) Military Policeman (MP) opened fire on a large group of Coalition and Afghan Forces who were conducting a series of briefings at the Marshal Fahim National Defense University (MFNDU) in Kabul, Afghanistan. MG Harold Greene (Figure 1), Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), was killed and 18 other Coalition and Afghan Forces were injured. The shooter was also killed.

(U//~~FOUO~~) MFNDU is a 5km² site home to the National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA) and the Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANAOA). Coalition Force Facility Qargha (CFF QAA), a UK run camp which is home to mentors supporting the ANAOA as well as advisors from NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan’s (NTM-A) Unified Training Advisory Group/Army Institutional Advisory Team (UTAG/AIAT), is located at the South-East end of the site (Figure 3).




Figure 1. MG Harold Greene




Figure 2. Marshal Fahim National Defense University (MFNDU)

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ CSTC-A is executing a phased construction plan for MFNDU using the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) as the construction agent. The UTAG planned this Key Leader Engagement (KLE) with CSTC-A and USACE to visit a number of locations at MFNDU to explain the ongoing construction to senior leaders. The focus of the visit was not so much on the construction itself, but on highlighting the subsequent officer production capability of the MFNDU once complete, and its importance to the ongoing growth and development of the ANA. (b)(1)1.4b

(b)(1)1.4b

(b)(1)1.4b This is essential to supporting the projected population growth of the MFNDU campus resulting from the new and planned construction. CSTC-A is preparing to fund USACE to re-award Phase II of the MFNDU construction (previous contractor, Lakeshore, defaulted in April 2014), but MG Greene wanted assurances from CPMD that they could resolve the identified water challenges. Overall, the KLE had three main objectives and was planned accordingly: (1) observe training and receive a UTAG overview brief, (2) resolve and develop a long term water distribution plan for MFNDU, (3) develop a common understanding of USACE infrastructure issues and turnover plans, and (4) discuss future Facility Engineer capacity (Exhibit A, Tab B6).



Figure 3. MFNDU Campus Site Plan Overview

~~(U//FOUO)~~ On 23 July, during the MFNDU Project Review Board (PRB), it was determined UTAG would host an on-site, general officer level meeting, to discuss the MFNDU water infrastructure issues. On 27 Jul 14 (b)(6) UTAG, requested that CSTC-A host this Key Leader Engagement (KLE) on 5 August, to

discuss these issues and to try and gain appropriate senior level commitment as to their resolution. (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) had responsibility for the planning of the visit; however, the itinerary was developed in close cooperation with (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6), CSTC-A CJENG, and with guidance from MG Greene and MajGen Benjamin Bathurst, GBR-A, Deputy Advisor, Ministry of Defense (MOD).

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ The plan for the KLE was to visit five locations at the NMAA (Figure 4). They were to initially meet at the K-Span Helicopter Landing Site (K-Span HLS)(Site 1) before moving to the NMAA weapons training range (Site 2). From the range, they would move to the blue main water storage tank (Site 3). Their fourth stop would take them to the South Entry Control Point (ECP) (NMAA Gate) where they would leave the MFNDU site and enter a previously cleared building that housed an underground water storage tank (Site 4). Their fifth and final stop would take them to a luncheon with the Commander of MFDNU (Site 5).



Figure 4. Visit Site Plan and Original Agenda

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Invitations were sent to various national support elements of the event approximately one week prior to its scheduled date. There were more than 60 confirmed attendees for the event on 5 August, including ten general officers. However, two of the invited general officers did not attend due to schedule conflicts (MG Ameree, ANA CPMD, and BG Jackson, IJC ENG). Two additional Afghan

generals were eventually included (MG Jalander Shah COM MFNDU and BG Sharifi COM ANAOA).

Personnel

(U//~~FOUO~~) The personnel who participated in the site visit and their respective organizations and functions are below, with General Officers highlighted in yellow:

Name	Nationality	Function
Wendel, Kevin MG	US	CG, CSTC-A
(b)(3), (b)(6)	US	(b)(3), (b)(6)
	US	
	US	
	US	
	US	
	US	
	US	
	US	
	US	
	US	
	US	
Greene, Harold MG	US	DCG, CSTC-A
(b)(3), (b)(6)	US	(b)(3), (b)(6)
	US	
	US	
	US	
	US	
	US	
	US	
	US	
	US	
	US	
	US	

(b)(3), (b)(6)	US	(b)(3), (b)(6)
	US	
	US	
	US	
(b)(6)	AFG	(b)(6)
Bartscher, Michael BG	DEU	Deputy Advisor, MOD
(b)(6)	DEU	(b)(6)
	DEU	
	DEU	
	DEU	
	DEU	
Bathurst, BJ MajGen	GBR	Director, MOD MAG
(b)(6)	GBR	(b)(6)
	GBR	
	GBR	
	GBR	
	GBR	
	GBR	
	GBR	
	GBR	
(b)(3), (b)(6)	US	(b)(3), (b)(6)
	US	
	US	
	US	
	US	
	US	
	US	
	US	
	US	
	US	

(b)(3), (b)(6)	US	(b)(3), (b)(6)
	US	
	US	
	US	
	US	
	US	
Russell, Bruce Brig	GBR	Chief Mentor, ANAOA
(b)(6)	GBR	(b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)	US	(b)(3), (b)(6)
	US	
	US	
	US	
(b)(6)	AFG	(b)(6)
	AFG	
	AFG	
	DNK	
	DNK	
	DNK	
	DNK	
	DNK	
	DNK	
	DNK	
	DNK	
	DNK	
	DNK	
	DNK	
	DNK	
	DNK	
AUS		
AUS		
CRO		

Shah, Jalandar MG	AFG	Commander, MFNDU
Sahki, Miyan-Yar BG	AFG	Commander, NMAA
Sharifi BG	AFG	Commandant, ANAOA
(b)(6)	AFG	(b)(6)
	AFG	
	AFG	
	AFG	
	AFG	

Planning

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ This site visit was to include representatives from several organizations and countries, and a number of different Personnel Security Detachments (PSDs)/Close Protection Teams (CPTs). The various security teams included were the Danish UTAG Force Protection (FP) Team; the British Camp Qargha Force Protection Company along with its Quick Reaction Forces (QRF); the US PSDs for MG Wendel, MG Greene, and (b)(3), (b)(6) the British CPT for MajGen Bathurst; and the German CPT for BG Bartscher. Additionally, the Garrison Support Unit (GSU) at MFNDU would have armed security present on some of the sites.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ The Danish FP Team had (b)(1) soldiers and was led by (b)(6) who had only been in theater for nine days. He had, however, conducted a three week pre-deployment site survey in April 2014. The Danish Team at Qargha began planning for the visit on 28 July. Between 28 July and 31 July, (b)(6) conducted at least two reconnaissance visits. He traveled the intended route and identified the main area of concern, Site 4 – the underground water storage tank. Site 4 was outside the base perimeter and within sight of the road (Route Orange). His plan was to surround and protect the location, while ensuring that the delegation members entered the building as quickly as possible and remained inside.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ The event planners did not envision such a large group. In fact, during initial planning, they estimated approximately 20 personnel would participate. The attendee list grew as interest intensified; however, this was never communicated to or understood completely by event planners or (b)(6) who was coordinating security.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ On 2 August, (b)(3), (b)(6) met with (b)(6) (b)(6) and the CSTC-A PSD assigned to protect MG Wendel (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6). Several statements refer to these personnel as the PSD for MG Greene, however, through interviews it was confirmed they were the team assigned to protect MG Wendel. (b)(6) briefed the PSD on the local security situation and the Insider Threat Assessment (considered low, as the

last attack occurred in October 2013). They conducted reconnaissance, traveled the planned route, and discussed security issues. (b)(6) identified locations to place sharpshooters on the roof of the MP Barracks building (where the shooting later occurred) to provide coverage of the built-up areas south of Route Orange during the visit to Site 4. He planned to conceal the security personnel positioned adjacent to the buried tanker in order to reduce the visible profile of the visit. He also planned to have explosive detection dogs sweep the area the morning of the event. Following this reconnaissance, (b)(6) requested the sharpshooter and dog team support from (b)(6) (b)(6) Commander QFFC, who approved the request. The PSD for MG Wendel were all Military Policemen (MP), led by (b)(3), (b)(6). They had trained together at the TRADOC Protective Services Course at Fort Leonard Wood, MO, and were certified during a Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) exercise before deployment.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Also on 2 August, BG Michael Bartscher's German CPT conducted a route recon from ISAF HQ to MFDNU. They were unable to gain access to the NMAA, as they did not have contact information for anyone at the site. They did make contact with the British PSD, exchanged information prior to the event, and planned to convoy out together. The German CPT, led by (b)(6) consisted of (b)(1) team members, all trained and deployed as a CPT, with most having several deployed combat tours as CPT personnel. This CPT had been in country for six weeks and had arrived without the benefit of a hand-over takeover (HOTO), as they did not replace a German CPT. The British PSD, led by (b)(6) consisted of (b)(1)1.4a personnel all specifically trained and deployed as PSD personnel prior to arrival in Afghanistan.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ On 3 August, the Danish FP team conducted a Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drill to internally communicate and rehearse the FP plan. There were no other PSD/CPTs in attendance.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ On 4 August, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) all of CSTC-A CJ-ENG, visited Camp Qargha. They met with (b)(3), (b)(6) and other stakeholders concerning the MFNDU water issues. They drove the route that the site visitors would subsequently take on 5 August to identify where everyone would meet, where the briefs would take place, and to identify any concerns. They discussed the FP matters and the logistics of moving such a large party, and made some minor changes to the plan. They conducted a final run-through of the route later that day. In all, the route had been traveled at least five times in the days leading up to the visit. The final plan was required to be sufficiently flexible to account for unknown final numbers of both visitors and vehicles. At this point, there was not yet an accurate understanding of the level of participation. The afternoon of 4 August, (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(6) made one final reconnaissance. No changes were made to the plan. (b)(3), (b)(6) and the PSD team for MG Greene also conducted an independent site reconnaissance this day.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ The PSDs for MajGen Bathurst and (b)(3), (b)(6) did not conduct independent reconnaissance specific to this visit. All had been to MFNDU before and felt comfortable with the route and location. Neither the PSD for MG Greene or (b)(3), (b)(6) had any formal training or certification prior to their assignment to protective service. The PSD for MG Greene (TF FURY) has since redeployed.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ There was substantial planning by the Danish FP Team at Camp Qargha, including multiple route and site reconnaissance. Unfortunately there was advance coordination with only one other participant PSD - that of MG Wendel. Despite the planning and knowledge of the area by other security teams there was an overall lack of coordination, exacerbated by incompatible communications, and lack of an established command and control plan. The overall security plan was not collaboratively developed, appropriately approved, coordinated, or rehearsed by all participants. (b)(6) and the Danish FP Team became the default security lead, albeit informally. The overall mission of PSDs/CPTs was the safety of their principal, meaning that they were trained to quickly evacuate and get their principal to safety, rather than augmenting overall site security or QRF activities. Ultimately, this meant that (b)(6) could only rely on his own personnel to implement important aspects of his security plan during the event, as the PSD/CPT primary missions were evacuation and protection.

Key Leader Engagement

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ On the morning of 5 August, the UK FP Co Quick Reaction Force (QRF) cleared and secured the firing range (Site 2) and turned it over to the ANAOA Mentors at 0715. At 0800 they also secured the K-Span HLS, turning this site over to the Danes at 0800. At 0800, the PSD advance parties for MG Wendel and MG Greene conducted link-up with (b)(6) and his Danish FP Team at the K-Span HLS. The QRF then proceeded to Site 4 where they cleared the area of the MP Barracks with a dismounted patrol and military working dogs. Unfortunately, the exact location of the sweep was not adequately coordinated. The QRF and dog handlers did not know the exact location of the underground water storage tank (Site 4), and ultimately did not properly clear that site. Instead, they cleared the sector to the east of the MP Barracks building inside the perimeter. They were scheduled to link up with advance elements of the Danish FP team at 0945 to hand over security of Site 4. The team waited for an hour past the scheduled time as they were not informed of any schedule delays. The night before, (b)(3), (b)(6) was informed of a 30 minute delay to the original start time



Figure 5. Visit Sequence

of 0900 by (b)(3), (b)(6), Aide to MG Greene. This was not fully disseminated to the QRF. Unable to affect link-up, and also unable to make communication with the Danes, they simply returned to base.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Given the projected delays, events were rescheduled to begin at 0930 hours at the K-Span HLS (Site 1), where (b)(6) (b)(6) would provide introductory remarks and an MFNDU site orientation. The event, delayed further by the late arrival of MG Greene and MG Wendell, began at approximately 0950. There was no site security or medical emergency plan briefed to the group. However, Brig Bruce Russell, Chief Mentor, ANAOA, provided a terrain orientation and highlighted the Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS), identifying it as being tethered to Camp Qargha, the UK camp. (b)(3), (b)(6) USACE, briefed the group on the progress of the three project phases, their respective locations, and expected completion dates. Security personnel were noted, by all participants interviewed, to be visible and sufficiently arrayed.



Figure 6. (Site 1) K-Span Helicopter Landing Site (HLS)

(U) At approximately 1010, the party moved in vehicles from Site 1 to the parking area for Sites 2 and 3, the NMAA officer training live fire range and the main blue water storage tank. There were 20-25 vehicles in the convoy. Along the route they meandered through several of the ANAOA construction sites. Due to time constraints caused by the multiple delays, the planned presentation on officer training and development at the NMAA was hastily eliminated. Instead, after the party dismounted from their vehicles they proceeded directly to Site 3. Site 3 was located approximately 200 meters from the live range, and less than 50 meters from a group of ANA Soldiers conducting live fire training.

(U//~~FOUO~~) At Site 3, there began a discussion of the water infrastructure at MFNDU which lasted approximately 30 minutes (Figure 7). All parties cite ISAF security elements were visible and sufficiently arrayed at this location. (b)(3), (b)(6) provided a site orientation, followed by (b)(3), (b)(6) with an MFNDU program overview. (b)(3), (b)(6) then highlighted water requirements by construction sequence, and the plan for servicing those requirements through a variety of sources over time. These sources included water wells, a water pipeline from nearby Lake Qargha, and also from the tie-in to the city water main (Exhibit B). The conversation also included a discussion between MG Greene and the representatives from the CPMD regarding the CPMD/MFNDU requirement to implement this long-term water solution, develop a project turnover plan for Phase II and III construction, and adequately budget for future Operations and Maintenance sustainment costs. MG Greene was preparing to decide whether or not to fund the re-procurement of a \$70 million construction contract to build Phase II, which would ultimately provide an assembly hall, additional training ranges and classroom spaces to the MFNDU campus (Exhibit C).

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ MG Greene emphasized again that the success of the current and future construction effort depended on adequate and reliable water infrastructure investment which was to be provided for by CPMD, which (b)(6) (b)(6) (CPMD) claimed they would deliver. This invoked a heated exchange between MG Jalander Shah and (b)(6). MG Jalander Shah accused (b)(6) (b)(6) of not being truthful about the ability of CPMD to deliver on their commitments. MG Shah urged (b)(6) to tell MG Greene and the other leaders present that CPMD needed their assistance in order to develop the required solution for the water problem. (b)(3), (b)(6) CSTC-A CPMD Advisor, was also scheduled to make a presentation at this stop, but it was decided he should delay so the party could continue on to the next stop, an underground tank along the boundary of the installation, where the main water supply problem could be addressed. He could make his presentation at that time.



Figure 7. (Site 3) Blue Water Tank (ANA Firing Point was to their rear)

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ After approximately 20 minutes at Site 3, at approximately 1045, the Danish FP advance team, with the Australian Sharpshooters, departed to clear Site 4 in advance of the main party. They parked at the corner of the road, on the top of a slight rise, above the South ECP. They conducted a dismounted patrol to verify that the route to Site 4 was clear and that the underground water tank was secure (Figure 8). The team placed the ~~(b)(1)1.4g~~ Australian sharpshooters, ~~(b)(6)~~ ~~(b)(6)~~ AUS-A, and ~~(b)(6)~~, AUS-A, and ~~(b)(3), (b)(6)~~ ~~(b)(3), (b)(6)~~ on the roof of the Military Police (MP) Barracks, while ~~(b)(1)1.4g~~ Danish soldiers cleared the walking route to Site 4. In order to reach Site 4, the party had to exit the compound and walk along a cleared trail outside the wire in single file to the underground tank. Upon clearing Site 4, ~~(b)(6)~~ left two soldiers at the site, and then he and one of his Soldiers returned to base to secure the exterior of the MP Barracks. Although ~~(b)(6)~~ knew the MP Barracks was potentially occupied by armed ANA MP soldiers, he neither cleared it nor covered the interior with any guard force as there had been no indication of a potential threat from there in the past. There were also armed ANA ECP guards on the roof of the MP Barracks, where there was a machine gun firing position that covered Route Orange.



Figure 8. Parking area above the South ECP and route to Site 4



Figure 9. Walking from the parking area to the exit point to Site 4

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ At approximately 1100, upon completion of their briefing at Site 3, the party moved in their vehicles and parked at the circle above the South ECP. Leaving their drive teams, but taking their PSD/CPTs, they consolidated and moved together as a group to the exit point in the perimeter (Figure 9), Lima Gate, and walked single file along the exterior fence of the compound to Site 4 (Figure 10). It had been previously determined, for security and spatial reasons, to keep the party going outside the wire smaller. The party visiting the underground storage tank would include general officers, their aides and PSD/CPT members, briefers, and select members of USACE and CSTC-A. The remainder of the group remained in a small open area outside the MP Barracks awaiting their return. The group remained behind schedule due to the late start and spirited discussion that occurred at the previous location, Site 3, between MG Greene and (b)(6), then MG Jalander Shah and (b)(6).



Figure 10. The walk along the exterior fence to Site 4

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ The briefing at the underground water storage tank, Site 4, lasted approximately 10-15 minutes. (b)(3), (b)(6) discussed the current problems with tying into the city main water supply, and the current condition of the pump system (Figure 11). It was thought (b)(3), (b)(6) would make his delayed presentation at this time, but a decision was made, due to security concerns, lighting, and the cramped space at Site 4, that he would simply set up and conduct his presentation in an open area behind the MP Barracks, just inside the fence line and along the return route to the parked vehicles (Figure 12).



Figure 11. (b)(3), (b)(6) briefs the group at Site 4, the underground water tank

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Upon completion of the Site 4 visit, the party moved back to Lima Gate following the previous route along the fence line. As the party moved back through Lima Gate, (b)(3), (b)(6) began to gather the participants into a horseshoe formation in front of his easel board in order to conduct the final briefing (Figure 13/14). Following the agenda adjustment at Site 3, (b)(3), (b)(6) was rescheduled to brief at Site 4. Due to the constraints previously mentioned, (b)(3), (b)(6) departed a few minutes early and returned to the open area just behind the MP Barracks to set up his briefing materials and prepare to conduct his brief. At this point the group was not only behind schedule, but this impromptu stop was off-plan and not coordinated with (b)(6). At the time (b)(6) was not concerned, he simply adjusted his perimeter and focused on the perceived threat location, which was across the road along Route Orange. He did not anticipate any threat from inside the MP Barracks prior, and there were no new



indicators or warnings to change his assessment. (b)(3), (b)(6) began his brief at approximately 1140, concluding at approximately 1155.

Figure 12. Site Overview of the South ECP, the MP Barracks, and (b)(3), (b)(6) briefing location



Figure 13. Detailed location of the (b)(3), (b)(6) Brief



Figure 14. Dispersion of participants approximately 10 minutes before the shooting began

31. (b)(6)
 32. (b)(6)
 33. (b)(6)
 34. MG Jalandar Shah
 35. (b)(3), (b)(6)
 36. BG Michael Bartscher
 37. (b)(6)
 38. Unknown (CPMD)
 39. (b)(6)
 40. BG Sharifi
 41. MG Harold Greene
 42. (b)(3), (b)(6)
 43. Unknown (Interpreter) U//FOUO
 44. BG Bruce Russell
 45. (b)(3), (b)(6)
 46. Unknown (CPMD)
 47. Unknown (CPMD)
 48. Unknown (b)(3), (b)(6)
 49. (b)(3), (b)(6)
 50. (b)(6)
 51. (b)(6)
 52. (b)(6)

* (b)(3), (b)(6) moved and stood where (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) was standing before the shooting began. (b)(6) (b)(6) had moved and was standing by MG Bathurst.

13. Unknown (AFG)
 14. (b)(3), (b)(6)
 15. (b)(6)
 16. (b)(3), (b)(6)
 17. (b)(6)
 18. (b)(6)

7. Unknown (AFG)
 8. Unknown (Interpreter)
 9. (b)(3), (b)(6)
 10. Unknown (AFG)
 11. (b)(3)
 12. Unknown (AFG)

(b)(6)
 2. MG Benjamin Bathurst
 3. Akter Mohamed Sahak
 (b)(6)
 5. MG Kevin Wendel
 (b)(3), (b)(6)

19. (b)(3), (b)(6)
 20. (b)(6)
 21. Unknown (b)(3)
 22. (b)(3)
 23. (b)(6)
 24. (b)(6)

25. (b)(3), (b)(6)
 26. (b)(6)
 27. (b)(6)
 28. BG Milyar Sahki
 29. (b)(3), (b)(6)
 30. (b)(6)

31. (b)(6)
 32. (b)(6)
 33. (b)(6)
 34. MG Jalandar Shah
 35. (b)(3), (b)(6)
 36. BG Michael Bartscher
 37. (b)(6)
 38. Unknown (CPMD)
 39. (b)(6)
 40. BG Sharifi
 41. MG Harold Greene
 42. (b)(3), (b)(6)
 43. Unknown (Interpreter) U//FOUO
 44. BG Bruce Russell
 45. (b)(3), (b)(6)
 46. Unknown (CPMD)
 47. Unknown (CPMD)
 48. Unknown (b)(3), (b)(6)
 49. (b)(3), (b)(6)
 50. (b)(6)
 51. (b)(6)
 52. (b)(6)

Figure 15. Identification of participants in the (b)(3), (b)(6) brief

Attack and Response

(U//~~FOUO~~) At approximately 1155, as (b)(3), (b)(6) completed his brief, the shooting began. Some described a continuous, rapid burst of gunfire, with others describing a couple or several short quick bursts. It was over in less than a minute. The shooter fired out of a small opening in the rear bathroom window of the MP Barracks as indicated below (Figure 16). The shooter had a limited range of motion as the window opened from the bottom, was hinged at the top, with the gathering assembled slightly to his right and front (Figure 18). The physical limitations of the window forced his shots into a tight wedge, and mostly low.



Figure 16. Briefing area facing back towards the MP Barracks

(S//~~REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~) Before the shooter could finish a thirty-round magazine, (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) both USACE PSD members, quickly returned fire that neutralized the shooter. The first to return fire was (b)(6). When the shooting began, he was standing just on the other side of the black and yellow barrier directly in front of the window. (b)(6) first shots were a bit to the left of the window, and he walked them to the right and hit the shooter. He fired approximately eight rounds. After he fired about five rounds, over his left shoulder he could hear another Soldier return fire.

(S//~~REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) had been standing several meters to the left and in front of the window (Figure 17) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was shot in the upper right arm and grazed under his armpit, but was able to quickly turn and return accurate fire through the window. He also fired eight rounds.




Figure 17. Location of (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)


(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) (b)(3), (b)(6) was hit multiple times, including two shots deflected by his body armor (left side plate and rear plate). He was initially hit in the left shoulder and dove to the ground, but says he observed (b)(6) to his left and moved to shield him. (b)(3), (b)(6) then stated he was able to fire several rounds from both his M4 (3-4 rounds before jamming) and 9mm (UNK number) before the firing from the window subsided. These Soldiers saved numerous lives as most of the gathering was either hit, and on the ground, or scrambling to get behind cover. Most had no idea where the firing had come from, assuming it had come from outside the perimeter. A total of 12 bullet holes were found in the window (Figure 18), undoubtedly mortally wounding the shooter.



Figure 18. Shooter's window (looking inside out). Note bullet holes and vertical/horizontal firing limits. Location of yellow/black concrete barriers can be seen here.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Despite the quick reaction of (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) the shooter was able to hit eighteen Coalition and Afghan Forces before he was killed. Figure 19 depicts the approximate location of the group about 5-10 minutes before the shooting began. (b)(3), (b)(6), Military Aide to MG Wendel, was not in this photograph, but moved into the field of fire shortly before the shooting began. (b)(3), (b)(6) Military Aide to MG Greene moved to a position beside (b)(6) replacing (b)(6) who took a position behind MajGen Bathurst. (b)(6) a CSTC-A interpreter, was injured trying to escape the firing, but was not struck by gunfire or shrapnel. In total, eighteen were injured and two killed - MG Greene and the shooter.

~~NATO/ISAF SECRET~~



~~NATO/ISAF SECRET~~

Figure 19. Distribution of casualties (red dots) approximately 10 minutes before the shooting began. Of note, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(6) had changed positions, and (b)(3), (b)(6) walked into the kill zone after this photograph was taken.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ MG Greene was shot in the pelvis and received two gunshots to his head and neck. (b)(6) GBR-A, who later treated MG Greene at the E-HLS while awaiting MEDEVAC, stated that due to the nature of the injuries to both MG Greene's brain stem and neck, he died immediately and there was no possible treatment that could have saved his life. Immediately after the shooting ended, (b)(3), (b)(6) PSD lead for MG Wendel, began to immediately perform first aid to stop the bleeding and attempted to resuscitate MG Greene but reported his vital signs to be weak and MG Greene unresponsive. (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
 MG Greene's PSD, carried MG Greene to a vehicle to evacuate him (Figure 20). (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) MG Wendel's PSD, drove with MG Wendel sitting in the front seat, and MG Greene lying in the rear seat while (b)(3), (b)(6) attempted to bandage MG Greene's wounds. (b)(3), (b)(6) backed the vehicle up, turned around, and headed towards the K-Span HLS (Site 1). (b)(3), (b)(6) MG Wendel's PSD, drove the other vehicle to the K-Span HLS where they established security, continued to perform first aid on MG Greene, and call for MEDEVAC.



Figure 20. Shooting scene moments after the firing ended. Seen are the evacuation of MG Greene, BG Sakhi lying wounded with a gunshot wound to his leg, (b)(3), (b)(6) being treated by (b)(6), (b)(6) being treated by (b)(6), (b)(6), and (b)(3), (b)(6) (foreground) treating (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) is lying along the planter with shrapnel wounds to his hand.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Another group of MG Wendel's PSD (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) was designated as the advance team. By the time of the shooting, they had already departed for the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), MG Wendel's next scheduled stop in the day. Shortly after their arrival at the MOI, (b)(3), (b)(6) called (b)(3), (b)(6) and notified him that MG Greene had been shot. The advance team drove back to MFNDU and was able to eventually link up with the rest of MG Wendel's PSD at the K-Span HLS.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ MG Greene's PSD, including (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) left the site with MG Wendel's team and set up security around the K-Span HLS. (b)(3), (b)(6) called the CSTC-A Operations Center and sent a 9-line MEDEVAC request.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) PSD for (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) were at the vehicles up at the intersection when the shooting began. (b)(3), (b)(6) ran down to the MP Barracks and up the stairs leading to the roof, as they thought the shots were coming from across Route Orange to the south. The people on the roof told them the shots had come from the inside of the building, so they went back down the stairs into

the area where they encountered the wounded. (b)(3), (b)(6) went first to (b)(6) (b)(6) Aide to MajGen Bathurst, and began to apply first aid to stop the bleeding. He was quickly relieved by (b)(6), one of the PSD members for MajGen Bathurst. He then moved to (b)(3), (b)(6) to begin providing aid.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) was standing near (b)(3), (b)(6) and dove for cover behind the cinder block planters along with (b)(3), (b)(6). (b)(3), (b)(6) told him he was hit and (b)(3), (b)(6) applied pressure to (b)(3), (b)(6) leg wounds. (b)(6) (b)(6), was nearby, secured some bandages from a truck, and passed them to (b)(3), (b)(6) treated (b)(3), (b)(6) and, after the more seriously injured patients were evacuated, assisted him into a truck for evacuation.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) ordered (b)(3), (b)(6) to remain with the vehicles and he ran to where (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) all with USACE, were located, near (b)(3), (b)(6) CSTC-A, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) were shot in the arm and leg, respectively, but their injuries were not life-threatening. (b)(3), (b)(6) told (b)(3), (b)(6) not to worry about them, but to help (b)(3), (b)(6) provided security with (b)(3), (b)(6) M4 while (b)(3), (b)(6) attended to (b)(3), (b)(6) examined (b)(3), (b)(6) and quickly applied a tourniquet to stop the bleeding. (b)(6) Medical Officer in Charge of the Qargha Role I MTF, later said this tourniquet application was one of the best she had seen, was applied to stop blood loss from a very difficult location, and had undoubtedly saved (b)(3), (b)(6) from bleeding to death on the scene (Exhibit A, Tab G9).

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) both with USACE, also came to assist. (b)(3), (b)(6) took cover at the corner of the building and took some photographs of the medical treatment as it occurred. They are among those included in this report. (b)(3), (b)(6) put a tourniquet on (b)(3), (b)(6) put a tourniquet on (b)(3), (b)(6) helped (b)(3), (b)(6) to a truck, and then later departed in another truck with (b)(3), (b)(6)

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) also took cover behind the cinder block planters. He remained there for several minutes until he got up to assist evacuating (b)(3), (b)(6). He then left for Camp Qargha with others from CSTC-A CJENG.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) MG Wendel's PSD, remained behind to assist with other casualties. He encountered (b)(3), (b)(6) MG Wendel's Military Aide, who was shot in the lower left arm and stomach, but was walking. (b)(6) UTAG interpreter, drove (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) CSTC-A, who was shot in the buttocks, (b)(6) who injured his back jumping out a window, (b)(3), (b)(6) a CSTC-A linguist, to the Camp Qargha Role I MTF. (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(6) left the patients at the MTF and returned to the site of the shooting to further assist.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ (b)(6), AUS-A, and (b)(6) (b)(6) AUS-A, both of the Camp Qargha FP Company, were the Australian sharpshooters who were assigned to support the Danish FP Team. They were positioned on the MP Barracks roof with the Danish FP Team (b)(6) two Americans, (b)(3), (b)(6) UTAG Infrastructure Analyst, and (b)(3), (b)(6) UTAG Public Affairs, and the ANA Sergeant of the Guard. The sharpshooters' mission was to provide overwatch south towards Route Orange and the built-up areas beyond. When the shooting began, (b)(6) was able to see the firing from the window directly below him, but was not able to fire his weapon, because of the angle. He shouted the direction the firing was coming from and saw (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(6) fire towards the window. (b)(6) wanted to go down and provide first aid, but (b)(6) kept him on the roof to continue to provide covering fire, if necessary. (b)(6) tossed down his medic bag and both of the sharpshooters tossed down their bandages, and tourniquets. (b)(6) had a Go-Pro helmet camera that captured video of some of the first aid and evacuation, from which stills were captured and included in this report. (b)(3), (b)(6) remained on the roof until the area was clear and they returned to Camp Qargha with other Engility contractors.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) was standing to (b)(3), (b)(6) left. When the shooting began, he dove for cover near the cinder block planters, but was on the wrong side and still exposed. He was hit by shrapnel in his hand. When the shooting stopped, he low-crawled over to (b)(6) but because of the injury to his own hand, he was unable to assist with first-aid. (b)(3), (b)(6) called out to him and directed him to safety near the building. (b)(3), (b)(6) returned to his vehicle, where he informed (b)(3), (b)(6) USACE, what happened. They brought the vehicle down to assist in evacuations. They encountered (b)(3), (b)(6) USACE, and (b)(3), (b)(6) and loaded them into the vehicle and departed for Camp Qargha. (b)(3), (b)(6) provided first aid for (b)(3), (b)(6) in the back of the vehicle until they arrived at Camp Qargha's Role I MTF.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ (b)(6) PSD for MajGen Bathurst, GBR-A, was standing near MajGen Benjamin Bathurst. When the shooting began, he pushed MajGen Bathurst between the large metal door of the ECP and the perimeter wall. As he was doing so, he was shot in the right arm and in his holster located on his right hip. When the firing ceased, (b)(6) GBR-A, British PSD, evacuated MajGen Bathurst and (b)(6) and brought them to the Role I MTF at Camp Qargha. MajGen Bathurst and (b)(6) were the first to arrive at the MTF.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ (b)(6), GBR-A, British CPT, was at the vehicles when he heard the gunfire. He ran to the area with his medical bag and treated (b)(6) GBR-A, Military Aide to MajGen Bathurst. (b)(6) was shot in the groin, arm, and right leg. (b)(6) British PSD, administered morphine and emplaced a life-saving dressing on (b)(6) groin injury. (b)(6) (b)(6) both of the British PSD, and (b)(3), (b)(6) brought (b)(6) to (b)(6) GBR-A, British PSD, vehicle and they evacuated him to Camp Qargha's Role I MTF.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ (b)(6) GBR-A, Royal Engineers, was standing to the right of (b)(3), (b)(6) When the shooting began, he went to the ground. When it stopped, he began to administer first aid to (b)(3), (b)(6) who was shot in the arm, shoulder, and leg.

(b)(3), (b)(6) CSTC-A CJENG, placed the tourniquet on (b)(3), (b)(6) leg. (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) CSTC-A (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) Danish FP Team, carried (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) on a poleless stretcher to a truck for evacuation to the Role I MTF at Camp Qargha (Figure 21).



Figure 21. Team treating (b)(3), (b)(6)

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) ran to (b)(3), (b)(6) Military Aide to MG Greene, who had several gunshot wounds, including one to his lower back. He began to treat the wounds and sent (b)(3), (b)(6) to get the medical kit from the vehicles. (b)(3), (b)(6) retrieved the medical kit, which he gave to (b)(3), (b)(6) She, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(6) and others bandaged the wounds and loaded (b)(3), (b)(6) onto a stretcher and carried him to a truck. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) lay next to him and kept pressure on his back while (b)(3), (b)(6) applied pressure to his side. (b)(3), (b)(6) rode in the back of the truck and had to hold (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) ankles to prevent her from sliding out of the back of the truck, as the tailgate was open. (b)(3), (b)(6) remained with (b)(3), (b)(6) throughout his evacuation to the Role I MTF at Camp Qargha and on to the Role III MTF at BAF.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) CSTC-A CJENG, took cover behind the cinder block planters, near (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) told them he was hit and (b)(3), (b)(6) crawled to him. After the firing stopped and (b)(6) yelled "shooter's down," (b)(3), (b)(6) ran up the road to mobilize vehicles for evacuation. He helped (b)(6) get into a truck and then helped a couple of others, including (b)(6), who was shot in the leg. After assisting in the evacuation, he went to the Camp Qargha Role I MTF with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) CSTC-A interpreter, who assisted in carrying (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) to the truck driven by (b)(6)

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ (b)(6) DEU-A, German CPT Leader, was standing on the East side of the group facing to the East when the shooting began. He was knocked to the ground somehow, but immediately got up and moved toward BG Michael Bartscher, DEU-A, Deputy Advisor, MOD, and (b)(6) DEU-A,

GSG7 Deputy Advisor, and moved them behind the yellow and black barriers behind the group. He radioed (b)(6) DEU-A, German CPT, and ordered their trucks brought down to the building for evacuation. (b)(6) DEU-A, and (b)(6) DEU-A, German CPT, were unable to bring the trucks down the road directly next to the building; instead, he parked at the top of the lane and ran down to find (b)(6). They linked up and together with BG Bartscher and (b)(6) sprinted back to their trucks. Once inside the trucks, (b)(6) who was also the team medic, asked if everyone was okay. It was at that time BG Bartscher realized he had been shot in the leg. As they were leaving, they also loaded (b)(3), (b)(6) into one of their vehicles and evacuated him, as well. The German CPT had planned to drive back to ISAF for MEDEVAC, but (b)(6) knew of the Role I MTF at Camp Qargha, so he led them there.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Brig Bruce Russell, GBR-A, Chief Mentor, ANAOA, took cover at the shed near the exit that led to the path to the underground water storage tank. He and an interpreter, (b)(6), assisted getting BG Miyan-Yar Sahki, ANA, who was shot in the leg, back to the shed, and (b)(6) put a tourniquet on his leg. Once the shooting had ceased, and (b)(6) cleared the area, Brig Russell went into the MP Barracks and confirmed the shooter was dead. Then he, BG Sahki, and (b)(6) evacuated to the Role I MTF on Camp Qargha.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) locked up one of his vehicles and brought the other vehicle down to assist with the evacuation. Later, after the area was secured, he encountered (b)(3), (b)(6) and gave him the keys to the locked vehicle so (b)(3), (b)(6) could convoy with them to Camp Qargha. (b)(3), (b)(6) attempted to get into the driver's seat and drive the vehicle, but realized he was too weak from his injury, so (b)(3), (b)(6) drove and they evacuated to the Role I MTF at Camp Qargha. (b)(3), (b)(6) drove (b)(3), (b)(6) to the MTF.





Figure 22. (b)(6) begins to assemble the hasty assault team. First aid continues to his rear.

(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO) Immediately after engaging the shooter, (b)(6) moved to the entrance of the building where he encountered a number of ANA Soldiers. He entered the building but quickly realized he needed back-up, so he left the building to assemble a hasty assault team. As he was leaving the building, he noticed (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) in a side room with injuries to his arm and stomach. He returned to the courtyard (Figure 22) with (b)(3), (b)(6) and talked to (b)(3), (b)(6) who called for (b)(3), (b)(6) all members of (b)(3), (b)(6) PSD, along with (b)(6), Danish FP Team. (b)(6) and his *ad hoc* team entered the building and encountered several ANA Soldiers standing outside the bathroom in apparent shock. One of them was holding the shooter's M16 rifle by the barrel. (b)(6) and the team stacked outside the bathroom and entered. They found the shooter in the corner shower of the bathroom in a pool of blood, barely breathing with his body armor off and no sign of his weapon. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) pulled the shooter out of the corner shower where he was hunched over and checked him for explosives (Figures 23 a/b and 24 a/b). (b)(6) directed the Soldiers to provide first aid, but the shooter took a couple of last breaths and died before they could do so.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ (b)(6) later asked (b)(6) to assist in translating conversations with the ANA present in the MP Barracks so (b)(6) could learn the identity of the shooter. He also directed (b)(6) to take photographs of the scene to preserve as much evidence as possible. (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) remained for about 10 more minutes until the rest of the patients were evacuated and drove to Camp Qargha with (b)(3), (b)(6). Several participants, including (b)(3), (b)(6) testified they heard shots come from within the bathroom after the initial shooting stopped. It is unclear whether Afghan Soldiers engaged the shooter and fired the fatal shots, as no evidence exists to determine exact cause of death. (b)(6) and his team found the shooter with his body armor removed. Also, Afghan Soldiers had met (b)(6) as they were coming out of the latrine, saying he was dead, and carrying his weapon. The Danish FP Team secured the area until directed by Brig Russell, a short time later, to turn the site over to the Afghans. During the time he was securing the site, several delegations of Afghan leaders came through to see the site. (b)(6) did not recognize them, but thought them to be senior members of the ANA. No further details are available. The next ISAF personnel to arrive on site were members of the ISAF Joint Command Joint Casualty Assessment Team (JCAT), who arrived around 1800 hours that afternoon. By this time the body had been removed, and the senior ANA investigator, MG Farahi (GSG2), was on site (Exhibit D/E).

Figure 23 a/b. Shooter was pulled by PSD members from the back shower room







Figure 24a/b. Shooter pulled out of the shower area where he was searched

Wounded

(U//~~FOUO~~)

#	Nationality	Service	Rank	Name	Category
1	US	Army	MG	Greene, Harold	KIA
2	DEU	Army	BG	Bartscher, Michael	A
3	UK	Army		(b)(6)	A
4	US	Army		(b)(3), (b)(6)	A
5	US	Army			A
6	US	Navy			A
7	US	Army			A
8	US	Civilian			A
9	US	Army			A
10	AFG	Army	BG		Gulalm Sahki, Miyan-Yar
11	AFG	Civilian		(b)(6)	B
12	AFG	Civilian			C
13	GBR	Army			C
14	AFG	Army			C
15	AFG	Army			C
16	US	Army		(b)(3), (b)(6)	C
17	US	Army			C
18	US	Civilian			C
19	US	Army			n/a
20	AFG	Army	PVT	Rafiqullah	n/a

Arrival and Treatment at Camp Qargha

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ The Executive Officer of the UK Force Protection Company on Camp Qargha, (b)(6) GBR-A, was first informed that there was a shooting at the NMAA when the Camp Qargha gate guard radioed up to the TOC that there were critical casualties at the gate. (b)(6) immediately attempted to call up a 9-line MEDEVAC request to the RC-E emergency number on the ISAF SECRET phone but received no answer. He then tried to make the request on (b)(1)1.4g but received an error message and was unable to post the 9-line. He then tried to call the IJC CJOC first dialing the rotary wing desk, the CJOC Director, the Shift Director, and then the CJMED desk all with no answer. He then called the UK Kabul Support Unit (KSU) at Camp Souter, who answered and was able to submit the 9-line MEDEVAC request on (b)(1)1.4g. MEDEVAC logs indicate that the 9-line request was submitted at 0753Z/1223D*. He informed (b)(6) GBR-A, the QRF Platoon Commander and (b)(6) GBR-A, the Company Sergeant Major of the incident then dispatched QRF 1 to clear, secure, and prepare the casualties at the E-HLS for Air MEDEVAC. QRF 2, with two Australian Ridgeback Ambulances, was dispatched to the site of the shooting to facilitate the movement of casualties back to Camp Qargha Role I Medical Treatment Facility (MTF).

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ (b)(6) UK FP Co Commander, directed the Qargha PTDS be re-oriented in search of other activity, but especially to locate the PSD of MG Greene who was not yet accounted for at the Camp Qargha Role I MTF. The Camp Qargha OPS Center located MG Greene's group at the K-Span HLS.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ The Camp Qargha Role I Military Treatment Facility (MTF) is normally manned with (b)(1)1.4a doctor, (b)(1)1.4a nurse and (b)(1)1.4a medics. Fortunately, the MTF was going through hand-over/turn-over (HOTO) the day of the incident. With the new staff present, capacity was nearly doubled that day. The team just completed a review of their mass casualty (MASCAL) drill and expressed concerns, given bed space limitations, that more than (b)(1)1.4a Category A (CAT A) patients would overwhelm the MTF.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ At approximately 1205 MajGen Bathurst arrived at the MTF on Camp Qargha with (b)(6). He encountered (b)(6) (b)(6) GBR-A, the Senior Physician at the MTF and MajGen Bathurst told her that there were at least five more CAT A patients on the way. Earlier in the day, the MTF staff heard rumors of a planned drill where they would be required to react to an attack on the camp. (b)(6) initially believed this was part of that drill, as (b)(6) (b)(6) appeared bloody, but did not have any field dressing on his wound. Once she determined that (b)(6) was in fact injured and that this was not part of a drill, she and her staff began what became more than two hours of combat lifesaving medical treatment. It was an absolutely marvelous display of professionalism and skill. Within four minutes, the remaining CAT A patients arrived.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ (b)(6) had a gun-shot wound (GSW) in the upper arm and was a CAT C patient. He was evacuated by the ground movement at approximately 1445 to the Role II MTF at NKIA. He was later evacuated back to Great Britain and he is expected to fully recover.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ At approximately 1207, (b)(3), (b)(6) MG Wendel's Military Assistant, was brought to the MTF. He was shot in the abdomen and left lower arm. He was taken to the E-HLS on a quad with a trailer at 1235 and flown out on the first lift of air MEDEVACs to the Role III MTF at BAF at approximately 1255. He was later evacuated to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC) and then on to San Antonio Military Medical Center. He is expected to fully recover.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ (b)(6) to MajGen Bathurst, GBR-A, also arrived at 1207. He was a CAT A patient with a GSW to his right elbow, and GSW to his groin and left leg. His right leg didn't have a pulse, as the wound to the groin had severed his artery. The pressure bandage (b)(6) (b)(6) GBR-A, administered to him at the site of the shooting likely saved his life. He was also evacuated at 1235 and flew on the first lift of air MEDEVACs to the Role III at BAF at approximately 1255. He was later evacuated to Great Britain. No further details regarding his condition have been released.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ At the same time (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(6) arrived, two other CAT C patients arrived. (b)(3), (b)(6) had shrapnel wounds to his right eye and a GSW to his upper right leg, and BG Michael Bartscher, DEU-A, had a GSW to his lower right leg. BG Bartscher was on the second air MEDEVAC at 1324 where he was taken to the Role III MTF at BAF. He was later evacuated to Marmal, and then on to Germany. He is expected to fully recover. (b)(3), (b)(6) was evacuated by the ground movement at 1445 to NKAIA. (b)(3), (b)(6) was treated at the Role II MTF at NKAIA and then evacuated to the Role III MTF at BAF. He was further evacuated to LRMC and treated there and at a German Hospital. He has been discharged and is convalescing in Italy. He is expected to fully recover.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ One minute later, at 1208, two other CAT A patients arrived, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) had GSWs to his back and lower right leg. He was evacuated by air MEDEVAC on the first lift at approximately 1255. He was further evacuated to LRMC and Walter Reed National Military Medical Center (WRNMMC). Tragically, he remains in serious condition and is (b)(3), (b)(6) due to his injuries.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) had GSWs to his left forearm, left shoulder, and his left leg. Immediately after the shooting, (b)(3), (b)(6) applied a tourniquet to (b)(3), (b)(6) leg and (b)(3), (b)(6) applied first aid to his shoulder injury, despite his own two GSWs. (b)(3), (b)(6) was evacuated on the first lift of air MEDEVAC and treated at the Role III MTF at BAF. He was later evacuated to LRMC and on to WRNMMC, where he continues to receive inpatient care. He is expected to make a full recovery.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Approximately one minute later, at 1209, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) CSTC-A, arrived with a GSW to her groin and her lower right tibia was shattered. (b)(3), (b)(6) applied a tourniquet on her leg at the site of the shooting. She was a CAT A patient, and was taken to the E-HLS in the quad and on the first lift of air MEDEVAC to the Role III MTF at BAF at approximately 1255. She was further evacuated to LRMC and on to WRNMMC, where she remains in serious condition. (b)(3), (b)(6)

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Also at 1209, (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived with a GSW to his buttocks. He was a CAT C patient. The MTF staff noted that he was carrying in another patient and cracking jokes, despite his own injuries. He was evacuated on the first lift of air MEDEVAC to the Role III MTF at BAF at approximately 1255. He was further evacuated to LRMC and on to WRNMMC. He is now convalescing at Fort Stewart and is expected to fully recover. Additionally, (b)(6) (b)(6) arrived at the MTF with superficial wounds to his left hand and left side. He was treated and released.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ At approximately 1210, (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived at the MTF. He had a GSW to his upper right arm and was a CAT C patient. He was evacuated by the ground movement at 1445 to NKAIA. He was treated at the Role II MTF at NKAIA and released the following day. He is expected to make a full recovery. Also, at 1212, BG Myan-Yar Sakhi, ANA, Commander, NMAA, CAT A, arrived with a GSW to his lower right leg. He had a tourniquet on the leg, but the medical staff was able to release the tourniquet and he was reclassified from a CAT A to a CAT B. He was evacuated on the first air MEDEVAC to the Role III MTF at BAF at 1255. He was later treated at the Kabul National Military Hospital and released. He is expected to make a full recovery.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ At approximately 1218, (b)(3), (b)(6) USACE, arrived at the MTF with a GSW to his lower leg. He was a CAT C and was evacuated by ground movement at 1445 to NKAIA. He was treated at the Role II MTF on NKAIA and released the following day. He is expected to make a full recovery.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ At approximately 1220, (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived at the MTF with a GSW to his right upper arm. He was a CAT C and was evacuated via the ground movement at 1445 to NKAIA. He was treated at the Role II MTF on NKAIA and released the following day. He is expected to make a full recovery.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ At approximately 1230, (b)(6) an interpreter for CSTC-A, arrived at the MTF with a back injury he sustained when he jumped out of a window on the site during the shooting. He was a CAT B patient and evacuated by the second lift of air MEDEVAC to the Role III MTF at BAF at approximately 1324. He was later released and has returned to work.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ When QRF 1 arrived at the E-HLS, also known as Qargha South, they immediately cleared and secured the HLS. Minutes after their

arrival, PSDs/CPTs began to arrive at the HLS with the wounded. (b)(6) organized the casualties by priority, not knowing how many helicopters were going to arrive, to ensure that the most critical were loaded first. There was a lot of confusion at the E-HLS, but (b)(6) organized the PSDs/CPTs, pushed them out to form a security perimeter around the HLS, and marked the HLS with purple smoke. (b)(6) the Senior Physician at the Camp Qargha Role I MTF, also moved down to the E-HLS to continue providing aid to and preparing each casualty for evacuation.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Four MEDEVAC birds arrived on the first lift when (b)(6) noticed that green smoke had been released at the K-Span HLS. (b)(6) immediately radioed the TOC to contact the MEDEVAC helicopters to touchdown at the E-HLS marked with purple smoke, and then radioed QRF 2 to move to the K-Span HLS and lead MG Greene's PSD to the E-HLS. The first lift of air MEDEVAC arrived approximately 20 minutes after the 9-Line MEDEVAC request was submitted. All five of the CAT As present at E-HLS moved out in the first lift to BAF Role III wheels up at 1255. Four minutes after the first lift of helicopters departed, the remainder of the CAT B wounded arrived. Moments later, QRF 2 arrived back at E-HLS with MG Greene and his PSD plus one additional CAT B. After substantial treatment by several medics and her, (b)(6) declared MG Greene deceased at 1304. At 1324, the second lift of MEDEVAC helicopters, comprised of two helicopters, departed with the three CAT Bs and MG Greene to the BAF Role III MTF. The remaining CAT C patients were moved by ground MEDEVAC in the two Australian Ridgeback ambulances and QRF 2 at 1445 to the NKAIA Role II MTF.

(U//~~FOUO~~) There were a total of eleven American casualties treated. MG Harold Greene was deceased; (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) were CAT A patients; (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) were CAT C patients; and, (b)(3), (b)(6) received shrapnel injuries to his hand and later received treatment for his injuries.

(U//~~FOUO~~) There were a total of two British casualties treated. (b)(6) was a CAT A patient and (b)(6) was a CAT C patient.

(U//~~FOUO~~) There was one German casualty, BG Michael Bartscher, a CAT B patient.

(U//~~FOUO~~) There were a total of six Afghan casualties treated. BG Myan-Yar Sakhi, ANA, and (b)(6) were both CAT B patients; and (b)(6) ANAOA Interpreter, (b)(6) ANA, and (b)(6) ANA, were all CAT C patients. (b)(6) was being treated at the National Military Hospital but has since been released. He is expected to make a full recovery. The other CAT C patients had minor injuries that did not require evacuation. The shooter was also killed at the scene of the shooting.

Air MEDEVAC

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ The first lift of air MEDEVAC departed at approximately 1255 and had the following patients on-board: (b)(3), (b)(6) – CAT A; (b)(6) GBR-A – CAT A; (b)(3), (b)(6) – Cat A; (b)(3), (b)(6) – CAT A; (b)(3), (b)(6) – CAT A; BG Miyan-Yar Sahki – CAT B, and (b)(3), (b)(6) – CAT C.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ The second lift of air MEDEVAC departed at approximately 1325 and had the following patients on-board: MG Harold Greene – CAT A (deceased); (b)(6) – CAT B; and, BG Michael Bartscher, DEU-A – CAT B.

Ground MEDEVAC

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ The following patients were evacuated by ground movement at approximately 1445: (b)(6), GBR-A – CAT C; (b)(3), (b)(6) – CAT C; (b)(3), (b)(6) – CAT C; (b)(3), (b)(6) – CAT C; and, (b)(3), (b)(6) – CAT C.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ While there was much confusion in getting patients to the MTF, some brief delay in ordering the air MEDEVAC, and further delay in getting MG Greene’s group to the proper HLS, none of that confusion or delay resulted in any diminution in medical prognosis for any patient. The first aid rendered on site, in the immediate aftermath of the shooting, as well as the performance of the medical staff at the Qargha Role I MTF was simply superb. The medical team that treated the wounded at the Role I MTF at Camp Qargha, and later at the E-HLS included: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Joint Investigation Results

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ The British completed an investigative report on the events of the day and it is included as Exhibit F. Despite assurances of cooperation, multiple KLEs, and a letter requesting support from GEN Dunford to the Minister of Defense (Exhibit G), Afghan cooperation has been limited and guarded (Exhibit H). The only thing provided thus far was an initial report, provided by MG Farahi the week after the event (Exhibit I). They provided some access to their detainees, but the leadership that was present during the interviews inhibited full cooperation. Additionally, there was evidence that was not made available, such as autopsy reports and ballistic reports.

What We Know About the Shooter

~~(S//NF)~~ The subsequent investigation did not identify any clear links between Rafiqullah and the Taliban or other extremist groups. Intelligence Agencies and ISAF Counter-Intelligence Analysts continue to investigate, but limited cooperation from the Afghan Ministry of Defense has made this process very difficult. Although there were many leads, nothing has yet materialized that conclusively links the shooter to any plots, plans, or person of interest. It may be that the shooter was self-radicalized, or that he suffered from some sort of psychological condition (which is what the ANA claims is the cause). From the evidence we have been able to ascertain from the ANA, and from several detained personnel we were able to interview, it appears the shooting was not premeditated, and the shooter simply took advantage a target of opportunity provided by the close gathering. More detail is provided in Exhibits J (IJC J2X CI Assessment) and K (TS ISAF J2X CI Assessment) of this AR 15-6 Report; however, the conclusions remain the same.



Figure 25. Rafiqullah Tashkera Photograph

Background

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The identified shooter was a single, 22 year old ANA Soldier by the name of Rafiqullah, son of (b)(6), Grandson of (b)(6). Rafiqullah was a Pashtun, from the Mangal Tribe, Parakhyel Village, Janu Khyle District, Paktiya Province. Rafiqullah was assigned to the MFNDU Garrison Support Unit (GSU) Guard Force, under the command of (b)(6) (Detained by ANA as of 10 August)

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Rafiqullah joined the ANA in 2012. His first assignment was the Garrison Support Unit (GSU) Guard Force, where he served as a Military Policeman since arrival. His recent duties were manning guard towers, where he rotated every three months. He was living in the MP Barracks, where he shared a wall locker with (b)(6). He was in the process of being moved to the East Gate Check Point where he would remain for the next three months. His move was delayed by the delegation visit on 5 August. Rafiqullah had not taken leave during the previous seven or eight months, and was purportedly not liked by other members of his unit. (b)(5), (b)(6)

(b)(5), (b)(6)

(b)(5), (b)(6) Interviews with other members all indicate he was

well liked and not a trouble maker. In fact, those interviewed expressed genuine surprise over his actions.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The ANA indicated there were no signs or indications of anti-US or ISAF forces sentiments; however, our investigation indicated he may have had some bias against Coalition Forces. In our interviews with (b)(6), a translator for the UTAG Infrastructure (Engility) Contractor (b)(6), he indicated several instances where Rafiqullah demonstrated disdain for Americans in particular. (b)(6) indicated seeing Rafiqullah on an infrequent basis, escorting contractors onto MFNDU while Rafiqullah was on guard at the ECP Gate. During those visit he (b)(6) and (b)(6) (b)(6) would provide Rafiqullah energy drinks and candy, but Rafiqullah would never accept them directly from (b)(6) – only from (b)(6). On another occasion Rafiqullah asked (b)(6) why he worked for Americans. (b)(6) explained that in working for the Americans he was actually working for the ANA, an answer with which Rafiqullah seemed satisfied.

(S//~~REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~) Rafiqullah had no known, or admitted, direct contact with ISAF forces on the MFNDU campus. He had passed a Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System (PCASS) interview approximately two to three months ago. His cell phone used seven SIM cards, but did not offer access to the internet and the cell phone exploitation (CELLEX) did not reveal media or pictures on the phone, bringing into question the claims by ANA Investigators regarding (b)(5), (b)(6) (b)(5), (b)(6). He was at the end of his enlistment and he was in charge of two personnel in his unit. According to ANA CID, he may have carried a fake taskera (stamp). The ANA detained several of his acquaintances for questioning. The results of our interviews with these individuals in contained in Exhibit J.

Atmospherics

(U//~~FOUO~~) According to ANA investigators, the unit was not experiencing tension or noticeable signs of conflict or disagreement. Unit uniforms, vehicles, weapons, equipment and living space appeared in good order. There is distinct rank separation, including ANA officer latrines separate from ANA soldier latrines. ANA soldiers conducting tower duties had to walk a minimum of 1-2 km each way to their tower duty location. The MFNDU campus is large and spread out with no designated transportation for maneuver in the area. A large number of buses and Ranger trucks are used and well-maintained. There are a large number of new construction projects in the area, including multiple-story barracks, all part of the ongoing ISAF efforts to improve the professionalism of officer training for the ANA. Fuel access is a constraint and dependent on 5 gallon jugs.

(U//~~FOUO~~) On 5 Aug Rafiqullah engaged his victims with an M16 rifle from the first floor restroom window located approximately 5-15 meters from the nearest participant. Rafiqullah had just come off guard shift with (b)(6) and (b)(6), another enlisted MP conducting a roving patrol with Rafiqullah. At approximately 1000

hours, Rafiqullah was notified by his Company Commander, (b)(6) to conduct a roving patrol with ANA MP (b)(6) to ensure that all partially constructed and empty buildings were inspected for security threats to a delegation of several ISAF and ANA General Officers. It is unknown exactly how much information Rafiqullah knew about the visit, or who would be in attendance. Rafiqullah was scheduled to work the East Guard Post for his shift, but was moved to the roving patrol due to a lack of personnel.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Between 1110-1120 hours, (b)(6) along with Rafiqullah and (b)(6) returned to the MP barracks and notified (b)(6) that they had completed the security checks assigned to them. The delegation had already arrived at the site, with the senior members enroute to the underground water tank and others waiting in the open area in between the barracks and ECP. (b)(6) informed (b)(6) to have (b)(6) and Rafiqullah to go inside the MP barracks and remain there until after the delegation departed. Soldiers in the MP Barracks had both weapons and ammunition, and no leadership was present to ensure they followed the instructions of their commander. Rafiqullah and (b)(6) did as they were directed, but went to separate barracks room. The barracks room Rafiqullah entered had two windows that looked directly into the area where (b)(6) was setting up his easel and where the delegation ultimately gathered for the final briefing of the day (Figure 16). (b)(6) continued to follow the delegation.

(U//~~FOUO~~) After conducting a review of the water tank located near the south gate, the delegation moved to the open area where the easel was erected for the delegation to receive a quick presentation. At approximately 1130-1140 hours, the delegation formed a horse shoe formation around the presenter. Rafiqullah most likely left the barracks room and entered the barracks latrine adjacent to the room where other ANA MP guards were gathered during the delegation site visit at approximately the same time. At approximately 1150-1155 hours, Rafiqullah pointed his M16 rifle through a medium opening, approximately 14-18 inches, of the restroom window and opened fire. Rafiqullah expended approximately 27-30 rounds of ammunition into the gathering which stood 5-15 meters from his concealed position. Coalition Forces engaged the shooter from two positions, suppressing further engagement by Rafiqullah. I have investigated the possibility that additional shots were fired by Afghan Soldiers within the building. There is no evidence in support of this. ANA personnel have made no claim to shooting Rafiqualla in the latrine and the ISAF PDS team who entered the building immediately after the shooting stopped, led by (b)(6) did not hear additional gunshots after the initial engagement.

(U//~~FOUO~~) According to the ANA, the shooter had purported grievances with his chain of command: he had to walk an hour to his post every day; he was denied leave for Eid; and, he worked double-shift guard duty and noticed other ANA MPs in the barracks laying down or cleaning. Based on the spontaneity of the gathering and his

grievances, it is likely that this was a target of opportunity against both the ANA and Coalition Forces, rather than a pre-meditated attack.

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Analysis

~~(S//NF)~~ See IJC J2X CI Assessment at Exhibit J.

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Analysis

~~(U//FOUO)~~ A review of post-attack open source reporting indicated one statement from Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid posted to the Voice of Jihad website on 5 August 2014. The statement glorified and praised the attack and characterized the shooter as a "...passionate Afghan soldier and a martyr." The Taliban has not claimed responsibility for the attack, nor have they claimed the shooter was trained or operating on behalf of the Taliban. Facebook, Twitter, Jabber, and other social media websites were reviewed for any accounts attributable to the shooter and none were found. There were no anti-coalition or anti-GIRoA sentiments identified.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

~~(S//NF)~~ See IJC J2X CI Assessment at Exhibit J.

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) Analysis

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Unplanned overhead imagery of the attack site from Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS) was available after the attack occurred and provided live video of the medical evacuation operation. PTDS coverage was not planned to occur prior to or during the attack; therefore, no overhead IMINT exists during that timeframe. A number of individuals took photos and videos of the day's events, and none of the footage indicated any participant, other than the shooter.

HQ ISAF J2X support in coordinating Multi- Discipline Analysis (MDA), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), and Counterintelligence (CI) efforts in support of the 15-6 Investigation

~~(S//NF)~~ Exhibit K (TS ISAF J2X Assessment) describes support in coordinating Multi-Discipline Analysis (MDA), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), and Counterintelligence (CI) efforts in support of the AR 15-6 Investigation and the Joint Casualty Assessment Team to determine the circumstances surrounding the August 5th Insider Attack at the MFNDU. The overall analytical effort revealed multiple indirect associations to known and suspected insurgent personalities. HUMINT reporting described misleading

information to include allegations of mental instability of Rafiqullah from Afghan Ministry of Defense officials. Additionally, HQ ISAF J2X ascertained the Preliminary Credibility Screening System (PCASS) examination of Rafiqullah, which was reviewed and validated by the US PCASS team. In addition, PCASS results of nine individuals currently detained in connection with this attack have been obtained and will be reviewed and validated. Exhibit K is maintained in TS storage and will be provided separately.

Findings and Recommendations

Findings

~~(C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ There was no negligence on the part of event planners or leaders present. This incident could not have been reasonably foreseen or prevented, appearing as an isolated act of a determined shooter without indicators or warnings. Visits are a daily occurrence to the MFNDU site. The Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANAOA) alone has hosted over 100 visitors in 9 months. Group sizes often exceed 20 personnel, and multiple VIPs are not uncommon. Planning for this event was conducted as all others have been before and deemed sufficient. Recommendations (below) can help to mitigate future risk.

(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Actions of Security Team members in neutralizing the shooter, rendering first aid, and evacuating casualties were superb. Despite the lack of coordinated planning, execution was swift and lives were undoubtedly saved as a result.

Recommendations

~~(C//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Require an appropriately approved Commander's Risk Assessment. For any scheduled event, a full Risk Assessment must be implemented IAW ISAF FRAGO 054-2012 (Enduring Force Protection Measures for Individual and Small Groups of ISAF/USFOR-A Personnel at GIRoA, ANSF, and other non-ISAF facilities). This Risk Assessment must be approved at the appropriate level given the grade and number of participants. In this case and for illustrative purposes, given the number of general officers present, approval should have been required at the three or four star level. Recommend the ISAF FRAGO be updated to address approval requirements above the grade of OF-6 (current FRAGO requirement). In addition, the ISAF FRAGO should be updated to include appropriate control measures. Control measures must be put into place to limit the number of participants for any event to that which can be reasonably managed and secured. Given the criteria established in

Annex B (Risk Assessment) to ISAF FRAGO 054-2012, this event would have been assessed as HIGH to VERY HIGH risk. This assessment is due to a combination of risk factors, spelled out in Annex B, to include:

- Threat Assessment (Medium to High Risk). Annex B defines a Medium Risk as one where there is occasional exposure to armed ANSF junior ranks and High Risk as one where there is regular exposure to armed ANSF junior ranks. In this case, the party was exposed to armed ANSF junior ranks both during the stop at the water tank adjacent to the active firing range, and during the transit through and eventual stop vicinity the MP Barracks where armed ANA GSU Soldiers were known to reside.
- Vulnerability Assessment (Medium Risk). Annex B defines a Medium Risk as one in which ISAF personnel are armed, in facilities with easy access to high threat ANSF/Afghans. In this case the party was in proximity to armed Afghans at virtually every stop. Of note, Afghan leadership (MG Jalander Shah) claims they were directed by the Coalition Forces to disarm, but the investigative team could find no evidence this request was ever made. The only reference to disarming Afghan Soldiers was in the statement by MG Jalander Shah's interpreter, (b)(6) (Exhibit A, Tab F8), where he referred to direction by MG Jalander Shah to his Garrison Support Unit and Military Police Commanders, upon their arrival to the K-Span HLS, before the events of the day began. Cross-referencing these risks with the number of potential casualties in a single event (10s), as defined by Annex B, made this a HIGH to VERY HIGH RISK event overall.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Require an appropriately approved Security Plan. For any scheduled event, a full Security Plan, informed by the Commander's Risk Assessment, must be implemented IAW ISAF FRAGO 054-2012 (Enduring Force Protection Measures for Individual and Small Groups of ISAF/USFOR-A Personnel at GIRoA, ANSF, and other non-ISAF Facilities). This Security Plan must also be approved at the appropriate level given the grade and number of participants. Security Plans for events that include multiple security teams must be fully coordinated and synchronized. The security lead should be the team with the most familiarity with the site and overall environment. The plan must be rehearsed with all individual security teams participating in the event.

(U//~~FOUO~~) It is imperative that all Personal Security Detachment/Close Protection Teams coordinate with the leading security element and conduct in-briefs, mission analysis, site surveys, and communications checks in order to effectively mitigate identified threats and ensure unity of command. Annex D to FRAGO 054-2012 (Exemplar Security Plan Template) provides a basic framework that must be expounded upon depending on the complexity of the event. All units are reminded to follow the procedures outlined in the COMISAF Insider Threat Tactical Directive dated Sep 2012; HQISAF FRAGO 140-2012 ISAF Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Countering the Insider Threat: Risk Mitigation and Reduction; and ISAF Insider Threat Handbook 2.0 dated 8 July 2012 when developing their Security Plan.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Review the operational readiness of Personal Security Detachments/Close Protection Teams (PSD/CPT) and Guardian Angels (GA) and

institute a standardized training and certification program across ISAF. ISAF Force Protection SOPs, FRAGOs, and GA Publications do not mandate standardized selection, training, and continuation training for GA. NATO attempts to stimulate Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) to fulfill the role of GA and outlines recommended training and in-theater continuation training but it does not provide oversight or manage a NATO-led GA training program. All PSD/CPT and GA personnel and teams must be trained and certified in advance of conducting security operations in Afghanistan. This certification must include theater specific training and orientation; advanced driver, medical, communication, and weapons training; rules of engagement and conflict de-escalation training, etc. A standardized overarching and coherent PSD/CPT and GA Program of Instruction must be a mandatory NATO requirement during pre-deployment training and followed by quarterly in-theater validation training supervised and approved by Force Protection professionals, and ultimately certified by unit commanders.

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ HQIJC DAILY FRAGO 12 August 2014 directs IJC and ISAF to review, update, validate (reissue) Force Protection FP, PSD, GA, Movement Control (MOVCON), Personal Security Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs), Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) to ensure they are in accordance with appropriate doctrine and/or Combined Joint Operating Area-Afghanistan (CJOA-A) Theater specific guidance. IJC and ISAF are directed to publish a Resolute Support (RS) GA and PSD SOP that defines these Force Protection requirements No later than October 2014 (Exhibit L). Also several courses are available for US teams. For Military Police teams designated for security duties, the Protective Services Training Course is available at Fort Leonard Wood, MO. For non-MP teams, the equivalent High Risk Personnel Security Course, also at Fort Leonard Wood, is available. Both of these courses would provide the requisite pre-deployment training for Personal Security Detachment personnel (Exhibit M).

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Review the ISAF standard uniform and the use of Personal Protective Equipment. The use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) should always be a consideration. In this incident it was worn by security personnel, but not by others, which is the standard practice in most key leader engagements across Afghanistan. The risk of not wearing PPE should be addressed in the Commander's Risk Assessment and adjusted as required based upon the threat. As a minimum, personnel should always wear their personal identification tags and carry appropriate personal medical accoutrement (tourniquet, bandage, casualty feeder card, etc) on their person. This is a discipline that must be enforced by unit leaders at all levels – typically the more senior members are the ones most often in violation. (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4g In addition, consideration should also be given to the purchase of concealable body armor to be worn by senior leadership, and possibly by all personnel who work individually or in small groups on a daily basis in Afghan facilities and outside standard ISAF facilities. This prudent force protection measure would not have been a factor in the 5 August shooting, but it does

provide a better measure of protection that would have little or no impact on the atmospherics surrounding our relationship with Afghan partners.

Recommendations for Individual Commendation

(U) Despite the tragic outcome of this event, it was replete with superb performance by leaders and Soldiers under fire. Although many of those present that day went above and beyond in rendering aid to the wounded, the following personnel warrant special recognition.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] (b)(6) (Danish Army). Recommend award of the Bronze Star Medal for Valor. [redacted] (b)(6) standing directly in front of the bathroom window, immediately identified the target and returned effective fire that helped to neutralize the shooter. He quickly reorganized his Danish security detail to secure the site and begin first aid and casualty evacuation, then immediately organized a team to enter and clear the MP Barracks, which he personally led. He effectively secured the area, directed his detail take photographs of the crime scene, then occupied and secured the scene until everyone was properly evacuated. He remained in control of the scene until directed to withdraw by Brig Bruce Russell. His quick thinking and decisive action certainly prevented further injury and death.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (US Army). Recommend award of the Bronze Star Medal for Valor. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) also standing directly in front of the bathroom window, was hit in the upper arm and side by the initial burst of rifle fire, yet despite his wounds was able to also immediately identify the target and return effective fire, helping to neutralize the shooter. Following this engagement, he immediately focused on treating the wounded, returning multiple times to the site and assisting in evacuating others with complete disregard for his own injuries. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) refused treatment until all others had been seen by medical personnel.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (US Army). Recommend award of the Bronze Star Medal. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) also standing directly in front of the bathroom window, was hit multiple times (3 GSW to the left side of his body: forearm, shoulder, and leg) by the initial burst of rifle fire. Despite his wounds he was able to also identify the target and return fire, potentially helping to neutralize the shooter. He initially reported to have thrown his body on top of [redacted] (b)(6), shielding him from the shooter; additionally he reports to have been hit twice in the body armor while returning fire (Exhibit A, Tab E9). In a subsequent telephonic interview I conducted on 30 Aug, [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) clarified his version to say he moved in front of [redacted] (b)(6) vice "threw his whole body on him", but that [redacted] (b)(6) had propped him up while [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) returned fire from a half sitting, half leaning position. In a subsequent interview I conducted with [redacted] (b)(6) on 5 Sep, he disputed the claim he had propped [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) up but again stated he did not know whether or not [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) had fired his weapons. Upon inspection of [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) body armor, which registered one hit in the left side plate and one hit in the back plate, it casts doubt on how he might have been hit in the left and back when he says he was hit while facing

the window and returning fire. Despite the inconsistencies in the story, and while is unclear his actions protected (b)(6) from injury, his version of the story and intent to protect is plausible, and has been consistent since his initial interview.

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (US Army). Recommend award of an ARCOM with Valor Device. (b)(3), (b)(6) immediately responded to the sounds of shooting from his location at the top of the hill near the convoy parking area. Upon arriving at the site of the shooting, he immediately began providing first aid to (b)(6) who was shot several times and was bleeding profusely. Once joined by a UK Medic who took over the treatment, (b)(3), (b)(6) gathered up two of his Soldiers (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) and followed (b)(6) into the MP Barracks to clear the area from whence the shooting came. He remained on-site providing leadership despite a gathering of armed ANA Soldiers and a very uncertain situation. His quick thinking provided immediate aid to stop the bleeding of (b)(6), then assisted in bringing order to the chaotic situation inside the MP Barracks.

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (US Army). Recommend award of an ARCOM with Valor Device. (b)(3), (b)(6) immediately responded to the sounds of the shooting from his location at the top of the hill near the convoy parking area. Upon arriving at the site of the shooting, he immediately began providing first aid to (b)(3), (b)(6). The doctor who eventually treated her at the Qargha Role I Hospital, (b)(6) (b)(6) testified that the tourniquet he applied was amazing and had saved her life. Following the treatment of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(6) joined (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(6) in clearing the MP Barracks.

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (US Army). Recommend award of an ARCOM with Valor Device. (b)(3), (b)(6) immediately responded to the sounds of the shooting from his location at the top of the hill near the convoy parking area. He first assisted in providing site security, then gathered up additional medical supplies to those in need, finally joining (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) in following (b)(6) into the MP Barracks to clear the area from whence the shooting came.

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) (Danish Army). Recommend award of an ARCOM with Valor Device. (b)(6) immediately responded to the sounds of the shooting from his location at the top of the hill near the convoy parking area. He first assisted in providing site security, then joined (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(3)(b)(6), and (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) in following (b)(6) into the MP Barracks to clear the area from whence the shooting came.

(U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6). Recommend award of the Defense Meritorious Service Medal and the CJSC Joint Meritorious Civilian Service Award respectively. The actions of both of these leaders were instrumental in organizing teams and performing life saving first aid on site, executing the initial triage of casualties, and organizing ground evacuation to the Qargha Role I MTF. While many performed basic first aid and assistance to those in

need, the leadership of these two individuals were critical in establishing the necessary order and discipline required to save lives and reduce further injury.

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted (b)(6)] Recommend the award of a Defense Meritorious Service Medal or the UK equivalent. The leadership and actions of [redacted (b)(6)] (Qargha Role I MTF OIC) in quickly organizing her small staff, leveraging available manpower, expertly tending to and preparing casualties for evacuation, then ultimately directing movement of casualties and sequencing of medical evacuation saved lives and reduced further injury. Her leadership and steady hand in reacting to an overwhelming number of casualties in short order had a tremendously positive impact on her staff, allowing them to execute their duties to the highest degree of professionalism.

Conclusion

(U) The event conducted on 5 August 2014 at MFNDU was not unlike other events of this type that occur every day across Afghanistan. Every day we send senior leaders and advisory teams outside the wire to conduct key leader engagements, site and unit visits. In most cases these events are conducted with a much smaller entourage, and often in a more controlled environment such as in an office or protected setting. It is noted however, that whenever a senior member of the command conducts any type of visit, they often find themselves accompanied by unexpected echelons of subordinate leadership that further include supporting staff and personal security teams. Between the burgeoning presence of ISAF personnel, coupled with the addition of our Afghan partners and their entourage, a simple visit can quickly turn into a major crowd that offer easy targets of opportunity despite the implementation of what was once an adequate security plan by event organizers.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The visit to MFNDU on 5 August was just this type of event. Organizers had initially planned on hosting no more than 16 personnel. This number grew to over 90+ personnel the day of the event. There were no control measures in place to limit the number of participants, or the entourage included. It has taken over two weeks to determine who all was present that day, and there is a good chance the investigative team may have missed a few, despite due diligence. There was no risk assessment conducted that included the entire party. That was an impossible task given nobody really knew how many people would be present that day. The security plan developed was more or less a basic construct, led by the ones most familiar with the terrain, but based on assumptions that individual security teams would naturally fall into place despite the lack of prior coordination and a synchronized communications plan.

(U//~~FOUO~~) This investigation finds no negligence on the part of any leader, or event planner. Individual site visits and speaking roles were well laid out, reconnoitered, and rehearsed. Deviations to the original plan occurred due to a late start, and spirited discussion among participants at Site 3, which led to an impromptu stop behind the MP Barracks following the visit to Site 4. As photographs show, the site of the impromptu

stop was the most protected of any previous site given the perceived threat – out of sight, surrounded by stone and/or concrete walls, and well-defended in overwatch by security teams and well-positioned sharpshooters.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Each individual element planned and executed appropriate security for their party. There was an adequate attempt by the local security team to develop an overall threat assessment and scheme of maneuver. The MOD has yet to produce any credible evidence or intelligence to suggest this was a premeditated event. (b)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(5) Absent indicators of probable cause, it is difficult to know whether additional precautions should have been made, or leadership present inside the MP Barracks that day, to ensure Soldiers followed their instructions to truly disarm would have made a difference in the outcome. A threat from inside the perimeter was never a consideration that day.

(U) Actions on contact were absolutely superb.

(U) There are many things we may learn from this experience that may help us prevent making ourselves an easy target to the next would-be shooter. The outcome of this case illustrates what can happen when we combine a determined shooter with a target of opportunity. In my opinion, this incident could not have been reasonably foreseen or prevented. This incident does, however, bring into question a fundamental problem set in how we must balance the need for maintaining an environment of trust and confidence with our Afghan partners, while providing adequate force protection for our advisory team members and leaders into Resolute Support.



DONALD E. JACKSON, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
AR 15-6 Investigating Officer

Enclosures
as

Approved for Release

~~SECRET~~



HEADQUARTERS
United States Forces-Afghanistan
Kabul, Afghanistan
APO AE 09356

USFOR-A CDR

7 October 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Central Command
(USCENTCOM), 7115 South Boundary Boulevard, MacDill Air Force Base, FL
33621

SUBJECT: Forwarding Action – Army Regulation 15-6 Report of Investigation (ROI)
into the Insider Attack upon U.S. and ISAF Forces at Marshal Fahim National
Defense University (MFNDU), Kabul Afghanistan, 5 August 2014

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded. I have approved the findings, opinions, and recommendations of the Investigating Officer.
2. EXSUM. A large group of personnel, including the Commander of CSTC-A, the Deputy Commander of CSTC-A and several General Officers from other NATO countries, and numerous staff personnel, attended a program at the MFNDU to confirm progress on a large infrastructure project that is required to support a significant increase in trainees at the facility.
3. Nearing the end of the program, the group assembled in a small open area outside an Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) barracks, to hear the last briefing of the day. The briefing was an impromptu event because the schedule had been adjusted due to stops that exceeded allotted timeframes earlier in the morning. Almost immediately after the briefing had concluded, at approximately 1155hrs, a lone ANSF soldier opened fire on the assembled crowd from a bathroom window immediately to the rear of the group. Several personnel immediately returned fire. Tragically, 17 U.S, UK, German, and Afghan personnel were struck with varying degrees of seriousness. Several were struck multiple times. Major General Greene was mortally wounded with devastating injuries to his head. The gunman was killed at the scene.
4. After the gunfire ended, medical care and evacuation began immediately. The wounded were evacuated to the British Role I clinic at the nearby Qharga facility for emergency care, triage, and medical evacuation. The clinic, which is usually staffed to handle routine medical cases, and a capacity to handle a total of (b)(1)(1.4) category (A) patients (urgent surgical), was going through a replacement in place/transfer of authority (RIP/TOA) which doubled the usual on- duty staff of (b)(1)(1.4) physicians, (b)(1)(1.4) a nurse, and (b)(1)(1.4) medics. The clinic treated six category (A) patients, three category (B) patients (urgent non-surgical), and nine category (C) patients (priority, not immediately life threatening, but could become life threatening).
5. A nine-line request for MEDVAC was received at approximately 1223hrs. By 1255hrs, all category (A) patients, except Major General Greene, had been MEDEVAC'd by air enroute to Bagram. All category (B) patients were MEDEVAC'd

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USFOR-A CDR

SUBJECT: Forwarding Action – Army Regulation 15-6 Report of Investigation (ROI) into the Insider Attack upon U.S. and ISAF Forces at Marshal Fahim National Defense University (MFNDU), Kabul Afghanistan, 5 August 2014

by air by 1325hrs. All category (C) were MEDEVAC'd by ground transport by 1445hrs.

6. Major General Greene was originally taken by his Personal Security Detail (PSD) to a landing zone that was not co-located with the Role 1 clinic. This was not discovered until the MEDEVAC helicopters began arriving to evacuate the wounded. MG Greene's PSD repositioned to the Role 1 landing zone and MG Greene was evacuated at 1325hrs. According to the Investigating Officer, MG Greene's injuries were fatal and the delay in his evacuation did not contribute to his death.


7. The Investigating Officer made a number of recommendations, including that several personnel involved in the response to the shooter, the medical care provided to the injured on the scene, and the medical care provided at the Role 1 clinic receive awards for their actions. He also made several recommendations to improve overall force protection in connection with the sorts of activities that were taking place on 5 August 2014, including improved communications systems between U.S. and foreign military PSDs, a more rigorous approval process for the sorts of events that occurred on 5 August, and review of SOPs regarding the wear of personal protective gear when participating in such events.

8. I have concurred with the Investigating Officer's findings, opinions, and recommendations, and will take appropriate steps to implement them. The investigating Officer will be made available to brief the chain of command, MG Greene's family, and others as appropriate. We are standing by to coordinate such briefs with your staff.

9. In conclusion, the tragic loss of MG Greene remains deeply troubling to this command, but the heroic actions of those who immediately responded to the crisis and avoided further loss of life and limb were truly inspirational. We will continue to execute the mission for which MG Greene and so many others have paid the ultimate price.

10. My point of contact for this matter is the Staff Judge Advocate (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) JAC, U.S. Navy. He may be contacted by your staff, by telephone at VOSIP (b)(6), or by email at (b)(3), (b)(6) should they have any questions regarding this matter.

Encl:



JOHN F. CAMPBELL
General, U.S. Army
Commander
International Security Assistance Force/
United States Forces-Afghanistan

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER/BOARD OF OFFICERS

For use of this form, see AR 15-6; the proponent agency is OTJAG.

IF MORE SPACE IS REQUIRED IN FILLING OUT ANY PORTION OF THIS FORM, ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS

SECTION I - APPOINTMENT

Appointed by General Joseph Dunford, USMC, Commander, USFOR-A

(Appointing authority)

on 5 August 2014 *(Date)* (Attach inclosure 1: Letter of appointment or summary of oral appointment data.) (See para 3-15, AR 15-6.)

SECTION II - SESSIONS

The *(investigation) (board)* commenced at Kabul, Afghanistan at 1500

(Place)

(Time)

on 5 August 2014 (If a formal board met for more than one session, check here . Indicate in an inclosure the time each session began and ended, the place, persons present and absent, and explanation of absences, if any.) The following persons *(members, respondents, counsel)* were present: (After each name, indicate capacity, e.g., President, Recorder, Member, Legal Advisor.)

The following persons *(members, respondents, counsel)* were absent: (Include brief explanation of each absence.) (See paras 5-2 and 5-8a, AR 15-6.)

The *(investigating officer) (board)* finished gathering/hearing evidence at 1100 on 24 August 2014

(Time)

(Date)

and completed findings and recommendations at 2200 on 31 August 2014

(Time)

(Date)

SECTION III - CHECKLIST FOR PROCEEDINGS

A. COMPLETE IN ALL CASES		YES	NO ^{1/}	NA ^{2/}
1	Inclosures <i>(para 3-15, AR 15-6)</i>			
	Are the following inclosed and numbered consecutively with Roman numerals: <i>(Attached in order listed)</i>			
	a. The letter of appointment or a summary of oral appointment data?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	b. Copy of notice to respondent, if any? <i>(See item 9, below)</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	c. Other correspondence with respondent or counsel, if any?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	d. All other written communications to or from the appointing authority?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	e. Privacy Act Statements <i>(Certificate, if statement provided orally)</i> ?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	f. Explanation by the investigating officer or board of any unusual delays, difficulties, irregularities, or other problems encountered <i>(e.g., absence of material witnesses)</i> ?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	g. Information as to sessions of a formal board not included on page 1 of this report?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	h. Any other significant papers <i>(other than evidence)</i> relating to administrative aspects of the investigation or board?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

FOOTNOTES: ^{1/} Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet.

^{2/} Use of the N/A column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation or board.

2	Exhibits (para 3-16, AR 15-6)	YES	NO ^{1/}	NA ^{2/}
a.	Are all items offered (whether or not received) or considered as evidence individually numbered or lettered as exhibits and attached to this report?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b.	Is an index of all exhibits offered to or considered by investigating officer or board attached before the first exhibit?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c.	Has the testimony/statement of each witness been recorded verbatim or been reduced to written form and attached as an exhibit?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d.	Are copies, descriptions, or depictions (if substituted for real or documentary evidence) properly authenticated and is the location of the original evidence indicated?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e.	Are descriptions or diagrams included of locations visited by the investigating officer or board (para 3-6b, AR 15-6)?	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f.	Is each written stipulation attached as an exhibit and is each oral stipulation either reduced to writing and made an exhibit or recorded in a verbatim record?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
g.	If official notice of any matter was taken over the objection of a respondent or counsel, is a statement of the matter of which official notice was taken attached as an exhibit (para 3-16d, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
3	Was a quorum present when the board voted on findings and recommendations (paras 4-1 and 5-2b, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
B. COMPLETE ONLY FOR FORMAL BOARD PROCEEDINGS (Chapter 5, AR 15-6)				
4	At the initial session, did the recorder read, or determine that all participants had read, the letter of appointment (para 5-3b, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	Was a quorum present at every session of the board (para 5-2b, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	Was each absence of any member properly excused (para 5-2a, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
7	Were members, witnesses, reporter, and interpreter sworn, if required (para 3-1, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
8	If any members who voted on findings or recommendations were not present when the board received some evidence, does the inclosure describe how they familiarized themselves with that evidence (para 5-2d, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
C. COMPLETE ONLY IF RESPONDENT WAS DESIGNATED (Section II, Chapter 5, AR 15-6)				
9	Notice to respondents (para 5-5, AR 15-6):			
a.	Is the method and date of delivery to the respondent indicated on each letter of notification?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b.	Was the date of delivery at least five working days prior to the first session of the board?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c.	Does each letter of notification indicate –	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(1)	the date, hour, and place of the first session of the board concerning that respondent?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(2)	the matter to be investigated, including specific allegations against the respondent, if any?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(3)	the respondent's rights with regard to counsel?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(4)	the name and address of each witness expected to be called by the recorder?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
(5)	the respondent's rights to be present, present evidence, and call witnesses?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d.	Was the respondent provided a copy of all unclassified documents in the case file?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e.	If there were relevant classified materials, were the respondent and his counsel given access and an opportunity to examine them?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
10	If any respondent was designated after the proceedings began (or otherwise was absent during part of the proceedings):			
a.	Was he properly notified (para 5-5, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
b.	Was record of proceedings and evidence received in his absence made available for examination by him and his counsel (para 5-4c, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
11	Counsel (para 5-6, AR 15-6):			
a.	Was each respondent represented by counsel?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Name and business address of counsel:				
(If counsel is a lawyer, check here <input type="checkbox"/>)				
b.	Was respondent's counsel present at all open sessions of the board relating to that respondent?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
c.	If military counsel was requested but not made available, is a copy (or, if oral, a summary) of the request and the action taken on it included in the report (para 5-6b, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
12	If the respondent challenged the legal advisor or any voting member for lack of impartiality (para 5-7, AR 15-6):			
a.	Was the challenge properly denied and by the appropriate officer?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
b.	Did each member successfully challenged cease to participate in the proceedings?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
13	Was the respondent given an opportunity to (para 5-8a, AR 15-6):			
a.	Be present with his counsel at all open sessions of the board which deal with any matter which concerns that respondent?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b.	Examine and object to the introduction of real and documentary evidence, including written statements?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
c.	Object to the testimony of witnesses and cross-examine witnesses other than his own?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
d.	Call witnesses and otherwise introduce evidence?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e.	Testify as a witness?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f.	Make or have his counsel make a final statement or argument (para 5-9, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14	If requested, did the recorder assist the respondent in obtaining evidence in possession of the Government and in arranging for the presence of witnesses (para 5-8b, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
15	Are all of the respondent's requests and objections which were denied indicated in the report of proceedings or in an inclosure or exhibit to it (para 5-11, AR 15-6)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FOOTNOTES: 1/ Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet. 2/ Use of the N/A column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation or board.				

SECTION IV - FINDINGS (para 3-10, AR 15-6)

The (investigating officer) (board) , having carefully considered the evidence, finds:

See Attached Report.

SECTION V - RECOMMENDATIONS (para 3-11, AR 15-6)

In view of the above findings, the (investigating officer) (board) recommends:

See Attached Report.

Approved for Release

SECTION VI - AUTHENTICATION (para 3-17, AR 15-6)

THIS REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS IS COMPLETE AND ACCURATE. (If any voting member or the recorder fails to sign here or in Section VII below, indicate the reason in the space where his signature should appear.)

(Recorder)

(Investigating Officer) (President)

(Member)

(Member)

(Member)

(Member)

SECTION VII - MINORITY REPORT (para 3-13, AR 15-6)

To the extent indicated in Inclosure _____, the undersigned do(es) not concur in the findings and recommendations of the board. (In the inclosure, identify by number each finding and/or recommendation in which the dissenting member(s) do(es) not concur. State the reasons for disagreement. Additional/substitute findings and/or recommendations may be included in the inclosure.)

(Member)

(Member)

SECTION VIII - ACTION BY APPOINTING AUTHORITY (para 2-3, AR 15-6)

The findings and recommendations of the (investigating officer) (board) are (approved) (disapproved) (approved with following exceptions/substitutions). (If the appointing authority returns the proceedings to the investigating officer or board for further proceedings or corrective action, attach that correspondence (or a summary, if oral) as a numbered inclosure.)

Approved for Release

7 OCT 14



HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

USFOR-A SJA

19 September 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Forces – Afghanistan, Kabul,
Afghanistan 09354

SUBJECT: Legal Review of Informal Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation
Regarding the Marshal Fahim National Defense University Insider Attack

1. I have reviewed the Report of Investigation and supporting documents provided by the Investigating Officer in the above titled investigation. This investigation complies with the legal requirements found in U.S. Army Regulation 15-6, *Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers*. Specifically, I find the following:

- a. There are no substantive errors in the report;
- b. There is sufficient evidence to support the findings of the investigating officer;
and,
- c. The recommendations of the investigating officer are supported by the findings.

2. As the Approving Authority, you are neither bound nor limited by the findings or recommendations of this investigation. You may consider any relevant information, even if it is not included in this investigation. You may reject the findings and recommendations, or adopt any portion of them, based upon your own judgment and determination. If you approve any finding or recommendation with exceptions or substitutions, such should be annotated. You may return the investigation to the Investigating Officer for further action you deem necessary.

3. I recommend that you approve the Investigating Officer's findings and recommendations

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Staff Judge Advocate

Page 1 redacted for the following reason:

Tab A - Storyboard - (b)(1)1.4b - DEFER TO NATO/ISAF

Approved for Release